Housing Bonds and Tax Reform: The Perils of a Partial Analysis of Low-Income Housing Programs by Nagel, Trevor W & St. Onge, Walter J, III
Housing Bonds and Tax Reform: The Perils
of a Partial Analysis of Low-Income
Housing Programs
Trevor W. Nagel and WalterJ. St. Onge, III*
While most persons in the United States live in housing that re-
flects America's prosperity and high quality of life by global stan-
dards, the plight of the nation's growing number of low- and
moderate-income households has worsened during the 1980s. A
1988 report by the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
University on the state of housing in America today depicted a dis-
tressing picture of the housing prospects for the nation's less well-
to-do and portended an affordable housing crisis.' Regrettably, the
the Tax Reform Act of 19862 has only worsened this crisis by failing
to consider the legislation's deleterious effects on low- and moder-
ate-income families and individuals hoping to find decent and af-
fordable housing.
The issue of housing in America encompasses values and politics
far beyond the mere provision of shelter from the inclement ele-
ments. Owning a home is both a fundamental ingredient and a
yardstick of the "American Dream." Since the 1930s, the federal
government has based its low-income housing policy upon the need
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University. Walter J. St. Onge, III, is an Associate at Palmer & Dodge, Boston, Massa-
chusetts. B.A., Yale University;J.D., Columbia University. Robert Hale and Gerry How-
ard discussed and commented upon previous drafts of this paper. The authors would
also like to thank Gerry Howard and David Pinson from the National Counsel of State
Housing Agencies and Amy Dunbar from the National Association of Bond Lawyers for
providing various research materials. Research assistance was provided by Mimi Ellis
and Robert Firestone, Associates at Palmer & Dodge. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of Palmer & Dodge.
1. Apgar & Brown,Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harv. Univ., The State of the
Nation's Housing (1988) [hereinafter Harvard Study]. This report concluded that: first,
the after-tax cost of homeownership is at historically high rates; second, the homeowner-
ship rate, particularly among young households, has declined steadily since 1980; third,
inflation-adjusted rents now stand at the highest level of the past two decades; fourth,
the nation's stock of low-income rental housing continues to shrink; fifth, for the grow-
ing number of low-income families, rents have surged dramatically as a proportion of
income; and sixth, the burden of spiraling rental payments has been a major factor in
the rise in the nation's homeless.
2. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as I.R.C.
(1986)) [hereinafter Tax Reform Act].
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to provide a "decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family." 3 The Reagan Administration reaffirmed this goal
when the President's Commission on Housing declared that "hous-
ing is a fundamental element of a strong State economy and a basic
social need. When housing costs become too high and the housing
recession occurs, there [are] widespread economic and social
hardships." 4
In pursuit of decent and affordable housing for all, Congress has
implemented a variety of programs involving both direct and indi-
rect housing subsidies. 5 One such program uses tax-exempt bond
financing to stimulate indirectly both the construction of multi-fam-
ily rental housing6 for various "needy" groups-such as veterans,
the elderly, and low- and moderate-income families 7 -and the pro-
vision of below market rate mortgage loans8 for low- and moderate-
income home buyers. 9
3. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1950) (emphasis added).
4. President's Commission on Housing, Report 3 (1982).
5. See, e.g., United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-896, 50 Stat. 888
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1430 (1973)) (providing direct subsidies to local housing
authorities to stimulate clearance of slum areas for new housing construction); Housing
Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 590, ch. 649 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1450 (1976)) (allocating addi-
tional monies for slum clearance and requiring localities to prepare master plans ad-
dressing local housing problems prior to receiving federal housing assistance); Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, 79 Stat. 451 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (initiating rent-supplement program and authorizing local
housing agencies to subsidize rents in existing housing); Housing and Community De-
velopment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5303, 5305, 5307, 5316 (1976)) (replacement of categorical urban renewal
programs with unified federal community development block grant program).
6. Qualified residential rental projects, as defined under IRS regulations, are build-
ings or structures, together with any functionally related and subordinate facilities such
as parking for residents, that contain one or more similarly constructed units not used
on a transient basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b)(8) (1987). A project may consist of de-
tached housing, row houses, high-rises, or other buildings with one or more dwelling
units, or the residential portion of a mixed-use project. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b)(8)(iv)
(1982).
7. I.R.C. §§ 142(a)(7) and 142(d) (1987). See also I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A) (1968), Mort-
gage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2660 (codified at
I.R.C. § 1 el seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). See generally Fernsler, Tax-Exempt Financing
for Housing and Community Development: A Year of Activity, 13 Urb. Law. 706
(1981); Pollak, Multi-Family Tax Exempt Revenue Bonds: The Policy-Making Role of
Regulation, 15 Urb. Law. 577 (1983); Note, Multi-Family Housing Bonds: Can The Tax
Code Provide an Efficient and Effective Lower-Income Housing Program?, 5 Va. Tax
Rev. 497, 498-502 (1986).
8. Mortgage revenue bonds are sold in order to fund mortgages made to qualified
borrowers to finance the purchase, improvement, or rehabilitation of either owner-occu-
pied single family homes, condominium, or cooperative units or two- to four-family
properties that the borrower will use as his principal residence. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ § 6a. 103A- 1 (b)(6), 6a. 103A-2(d).
9. I.R.C. § 143 (1986). The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980 radically




Indirect subsidies for affordable housing through the issuance of
tax-exempt bonds, however, have been subject to considerable criti-
cism and legislative review.' 0 During the past few years, Treasury
officials and other commentators have charged that tax-exempt
bonds are a highly inefficient means of subsidizing the nation's stock
of affordable housing; they have contended that the government has
lost more in forgone revenue than low- and moderate-income fami-
lies have gained in housing income supplements." Moreover, the
efficacy of these bond-financed programs has been questioned on
the ground that they have only assisted middle-income families, who
could afford to rent or buy in the conventional housing market, in
moving up to better housing.' 2
Although most of the tax reforms of the early 1980s targeted tax-
exempt housing bond proceeds more toward low- and moderate-
income individuals and families, the Tax Reform Act was a major
legislative assault upon the ability to obtain tax-exempt financing for
low- and moderate-income housing. The Act has severely curtailed
the development of subsidized multi-family rental housing for low-
and moderate-income families and, unless amended, will abolish
tax-exempt bond financed mortgage purchase programs for these
groups at the end of 1988. The Tax Reform Act has only contrib-
on single family residences. See supra note 7. See generally Brunken, Tax-Exempt Mort-
gage Revenue Btrnds: Another Case of "Opiate Economics"?, II Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 473
(1980); Broadus, The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980: A Step in the Wrong
Direction, 9 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 469 (1981).
Issuers of mortgage revenue bonds may also elect to trade in portions of their mort-
gage revenue bond authority in order to issue tax credits to low- and moderate-income
homeowners. See I.R.C. § 25 (1986) (providing for tax credits to homeowners holding
"mortgage credit certificates" issued in lieu of mortgage revenue bonds).
10. See, e.g., Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980, supra note 7; Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified at I.R.C. § 1
et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
494 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). For brief accounts of the pre-
Tax Reform Act debate concerning proposed legislative amendments to multi-family
housing bond programs, compare Tax Exempt Rental Housing Bonds: A Tax Subsidy
Gone Awry, 28 Tax Notes 9 (1985) (critique of pre-1986 Tax Reform program) with
Subcommittee Urged to Retain Multi-Family Housing IDBs, 28 Tax Notes 606 (1985)
(support for pre-1986 Tax Reform program).
11. See, e.g., Tax-Exempt Bonds for Multi Family Residential Real Property: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (statement of Mikel M. Rollyson, Tax Legislative Counsel, De-
partment of the Treasury) [hereinafter Rollyson]; U.S. General Accounting Office, Re-
port to the Chairman, Joint Comm. on Taxation, Home Ownership: Mortgage Bonds
are Costly and Provide Little Assistance to Those in Need (1988) [hereinafter GAO Re-
port]; Beek, Rethinking Tax Exempt Financing for State and Local Governments, Fed.
Res. Bank. N.Y.Q. Rev. 30-31 (Autumn 1982).
12. See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office Study, House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax-Exempt Bonds for Single-Family Housing
(Comm. Print 1979); GAO Rep., supra note 11 (mortgage revenue bonds).
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uted further to the nation's crisis in affordable housing and has re-
moved the federal government from its traditional leading role in
providing safe, decent, and affordable housing for its citizens. It is
distressing that the legislative process of fiscal review, unmindful of
housing concerns, has had such a dramatic and negative impact
upon housing policy.
L A Brief History of Tax-Exempt Housing
Since 1913, when the first income tax was enacted,' 3 the federal
government has provided an exemption for interest on bonds issued
"by or on behalf of" state and local governments. 14 Tax-exempt
bonds were typically issued as general obligation debt backed by the
taxing power of the issuer to carry out "fundamental" governmental
purposes, such as providing water and sewer services, electric gen-
eration, and schools, roads, and highways.' 5 As the New Deal broad-
ened government's role in the daily life of America, state and local
governments began to use bond financing to subsidize private busi-
ness activities that were deemed to serve a "public purpose."' 6
Over the past fifty years, an ever-increasing amount of tax-exempt
bonds have been issued to finance private ventures such as the rede-
velopment of blighted urban areas, the provision of jobs through
industrial development loans to private businesses, and the subsidi-
zation of privately owned housing.' 7
Revenue bonds have financed most of these privately owned ven-
tures. Unlike a general obligation bond,' 8 which is backed by the
full faith and credit of the state or political subdivision that issued it,
a revenue bond' 9 is secured by and payable solely from the income
stream generated by the facilities or programs financed with the
bond proceeds. When issuing a revenue bond, the political subdivi-
sion often acts solely as a conduit having no obligation, and fre-
13. Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, ch. 16.
14. Id. at 168. Interest on municipal bonds had been treated as exempt from most
state and local taxes long before the enactment of this act. See generally Adymy, The
Constitutionality of Federal Income Taxation of Interest Earned on State and Municipal
Bonds, 50 Alb. L. Rev. 55 (1985). However, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the
Federal tax exemption for state and local government bonds is not constitutionally man-
dated. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988).
15. See generally Zimmerman, Limiting the Growth of Tax-Exempt Industrial Devel-
opment Bonds: An Economic Evaluation 5 (1984).
16. Id. at 6-7.
17. See generally Lamb & Rappaport, Municipal Bonds 4, 14-16 (1980).
18. Id. at 9, 14.




quently no authority, to use tax revenues to cover any shortfall in
revenues.
Historically, there were few restrictions upon the issuance of tax-
exempt bonds by state and local governments and their political
subdivisions. 20 The 1960s saw a sharp increase in the volume of
tax-exempt revenue bonds issued for quasi-public purposes 2 1 as
state and local governments recognized that by issuing revenue
bonds they could shift risk to bondholders and cost to federal tax-
payers. 22 In response to this trend, the Internal Revenue Service
proposed restrictions limiting the issuance of bonds to certain pre-
scribed "public purposes." 23 As adopted by Congress, one of these
sanctioned purposes was the issuance of bonds to construct resi-
dences for families. 24 Congress imposed very few restrictions on
this program. 25 For example, there was no requirement that the
subsidized housing be reserved for any particular low- or moderate-
income group or even be multi-family rental housing. Indeed, the
regulations promulgated in 1972 explicitly provided that tax-ex-
empt bond financing was available for the provision of "standard
housing, either single or multi-family and either [rental] or owner-
occupied." 26 Hence, virtually any residential family development
could qualify for tax-exempt bond financing.
Commencing with New York in 1960,27 states began to enact leg-
islation providing for state28 and local29 housing finance agencies
(HFAs) to finance a wide range of private housing programs
designed to provide decent and affordable housing for low- and
20. See generally Adymy, supra note 14.
21. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess., Tax Reform Proposals:
Tax Treatment of State and Local Government Bonds 32 (Jt. Comm. Print 1985).
22. Traditionally, state and local governments had borrowed against the tax base of
the governmental entity in order to raise funds for public purposes. In that situation,
the governmental unit, and more importantly the taxpayers, had to bear both the risks
and costs of the borrowing. When mortgage revenue bond issues are substituted for
direct governmental debt, the risk of the borrowing is transferred to the bondholders
and the costs are shifted to the federal taxpayer through the tax subsidy for the tax-
exempt bonds.
23. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7, 33 Fed. Reg. 4940 (1968).
24. Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat. 251,
267 (1968) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A) (1984)).
25. The legislative history of the 1968 Act exemption for "residential real property
for family units" contains no reference to restricting the exemption to low- or moderate-
income or other target groups. H.R. Rep. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 36-38,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2373, 2383-85.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(b). For a commentary on these regulations, see Pollak,
supra note 7, at 585-86.
27. N.Y. Pub. Hous. Law. §§ 340-57 (McKinney 1960) (later repealed).
28. See, e.g., 1966 Mass. Acts 708, as amended.
29. See, e.g., 1988 R.I. Pub. Laws 10.
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moderate-income families and individuals and to meet special hous-
ing needs for groups such as the elderly and the homeless. 30 HFAs
now exist in nearly every state, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Some agencies are part of state
government, but the majority are independent or quasi-independ-
ent bodies. HFAs generally are run on a day-to-day basis by a paid,
full-time staff and governed by an appointed board of directors
comprised of ex-officio government officials, representatives of the
housing and banking industries, and members of the general public.
Although some state agencies receive state appropriations for their
programs, most HFAs depend on the ability to issue tax-exempt
bonds to finance these housing programs.
During the late 1970s, the volume of housing bonds increased
rapidly. The annual volume of multi-family housing bonds rose
from $900 million in 1975 to $2.9 billion in 1977, and then declined
slightly to $2.7 billion in 1979. During the same period, the volume
of mortgage revenue bonds escalated from less than $50 million in
1975 to $7.8 billion in 1979. 3 1 Clearly, spiraling inflation contrib-
uted to this growth. The inflationary economy of the 1970s pro-
duced high interest rates that, in turn, pushed up rents, and also
resulted in conventional mortgage interest rates rising beyond the
reach of many low- and moderate-income families. The demand for
below market rate financing grew commensurately. It has also been
argued that the policies of fiscal constraint that dominated budget
debates throughout this period produced a decline in direct federal
expenditures in housing programs. 32 Concomitant with the in-
creased volume of housing bonds was a heightened concern with
perceived "abuses" of these programs, such as the provision of
"luxury" apartments, and federal revenue losses associated with the
increased volume of tax-exempt financing.
Prior to enactment of the Tax Reform Act, legislation had been
introduced on three different occasions during the 1980s to restrict
housing programs to low- and moderate-income families and indi-
viduals.3 3 The political climate of the late 1970s and 1980s that en-
30. HFAs must be distinguished from public housing authorities that were associ-
ated with well-publicized high-rise housing developments in the 1960s. The advent of
the HFA signaled the beginning of the privatization of the provision of decent and af-
fordable housing for low-income renters and home buyers.
31. Rollyson, supra note 1I, at Table 1; Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., Background and Issues Regarding H.R. 3712 Relating to Tax-Exempt Bonds for
Housing 48 (Jt. Comm. Print 1979).
32. See Rollyson, supra note 11, at 4-5.




couraged cutbacks in public spending at all levels of government
fostered the view that federal housing supplements (direct or indi-
rect) should be available only to those who could not otherwise af-
ford decent quality housing, and not to higher income persons.
Although these legislative restrictions targeted housing bond pro-
ceeds toward more needy groups, they did not result in a decline in
the construction of multi-family rental developments or in the vol-
ume of tax-exempt financed mortgages for low- and moderate-in-
come households.3 4  Indeed, these restrictions evidenced the
federal government's commitment to providing or spurring private
development of decent housing. The restrictions rightly targeted
those segments of society most in need of assistance.
The mechanisms for ensuring that tax-exempt bond financing was
targeted toward low- and moderate-income groups differed for
multi-family rental housing bonds and single family mortgage
bonds. With respect to multi-family rental housing financings, since
1982 developers have generally been required to set aside at least
20% of the units constructed using tax-exempt bond proceeds for
persons of "low- or moderate-income. '35 With regard to single
family mortgage bonds, Congress adopted a series of targeting
mechanisms rather than imposing income limits on prospective
home buyers. The primary targeting mechanisms were purchase
price limits and the "first-time home buyer" rule. Purchase price
limits imposed a ceiling on the cost of a residence that could be
financed with tax-exempt bond proceeds.36 These purchase price
limits generally restricted tax-exempt mortgage financing to resi-
dences located in low- and moderate-income areas or to housing
generally below the median price for an area, housing that would
not appeal to higher income bracket purchasers who could afford
more prestigious homes. Congress also limited the availability of
mortgages financed through the issuance of qualified mortgage
34. See Rollyson, supra note 11, at 4 (multi-family rental housing developments);
GAO Rep., supra note 11, at 10-11 (tax-exempt mortgages).
35. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A)(ii) (1984). Only a 15% set aside was required for develop-
ments in targeted areas. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A)(i) (1984). An eligible "low- or moder-
ate-income" resident was a tenant who, at the time of occupancy, did not have an
adjusted income, computed under Treas. Reg. § 1.167-k(3)(b)(3) (1984), in excess of
80% of the gross median income for the applicable area as established by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. I.R.C. § 103(b)(12)(C) (1984).
Unfortunately, the legislative history concerning these set-aside requirements pro-
vides virtually no clue as to why the 20% figure was determined to be the appropriate
minimum level of low-income dwellings. See Tax Treatment of Mortgage Subsidy
Bonds: Hearings on H.R. 3712 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
36. I.R.C. § 103A(f) (1984).
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bonds to people who had not owned a residence in the past three
years. 37 This restriction rendered a substantial number of potential
borrowers ineligible for tax-exempt mortgages. In addition, at least
20% of the lendable proceeds of a qualified mortgage bond issue
was required to be reserved for at least one year to make loans for
the purchase of homes in "targeted areas." 38 Targeted areas were
defined to include both "qualified census tracts" in which at least
70% of the families had annual incomes no higher than 80% of the
statewide median income, 39 and designated areas of chronic eco-
nomic distress.40
In order to limit federal revenue losses through qualified mort-
gage bond financings, Congress imposed an annual limit on the dol-
lar amount of mortgage revenue bonds that could be issued by each
state4' and provided that the federal authorization for qualified
mortgaged bonds expire December 31, 1987.42
II. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986,43 which curtailed the issuance of all
forms of tax-exempt debt, imposed further restrictions on the issu-
ance of tax-exempt housing bonds.44 These new restrictions, when
coupled with other new limits on the tax advantages of owning real
estate generally, 45 are producing a dramatic and long-term negative
37. I.R.C. § 103A(e) (1984). Rev. Proc. 82-16, 1982-1 I.R.B. 461, established proce-
dures for verifying satisfaction of the three-year requirement through use of information
from income tax returns.
38. I.R.C. § 103A(h)(i) (1984).
39. I.R.C. § 103A(k)(2) (1984). See Rev. Proc. 83-51, 1983-2 I.R.B. 555, for a list of
qualified census tracts.
40. I.R.C. § 103A(k)(3) (1984). The aggregate population in all areas of chronic
economic distress within any state may not exceed 20%o of that state's total population,
excluding the population already included in qualified census tracts. Rev. Proc. 81-30,
1981-2 I.R.B. 555, sets forth the procedures for requesting approval of a state designa-
tion as an "area of chronic economic distress."
41. I.R.C. § 103A(g) (1984). The ceiling applicable to any state for any calendar
year was the greater of $200 million or 9% of the average annual aggregate principal
amount of mortgages exempted during the immediately preceding three calendar years
for single family owner-occupied residences within the state.
42. I.R.C. § 103A(c)(I)(B) (1984).
43. Tax Reform Act, supra note 2.
44. Tax Reform Act, supra note 2, at § 130 1(b).
45. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (1986) (modifying the § 168 Accelerated Cost Recovery
System of depreciation by extending the recovery period to 27.5 years for residential
rental property); I.R.C. § 42 (1986) (providing that the cost of low-income housing be
recovered over 27.5 years on a straight-line basis instead of a 15-year declining balance
method, and that low-income housing is no longer exempt from the capitalization re-
quirements for construction period interest and taxes); I.R.C. § 469 (1986) (allowing
losses and credits from post-1986 passive activities only to the extent of income from




effect on the production of low- and moderate-income housing in
America.
At a general level, the Tax Reform Act has curtailed the ability of
HFAs to issue tax-exempt debt and has thereby reduced those agen-
cies' ability to finance subsidized housing. The Act restricts the
availability of tax-exempt housing finance by making both multi-
family and single family housing bonds subject to a state volume cap
on private activity bonds.46
Section 146 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code) im-
poses a volume cap on the aggregate amount of private activity
bonds that any state may issue annually. In 1987, the volume cap
was equal to the greater of $250 million or an amount equal to $75
multiplied by the population of the state. 47 Each state's volume cap
was further reduced in 1988.48 Thus, HFAs must now compete with
industrial development authorities and other state agencies and pri-
vate activity bond issuers for a share of the limited state volume
cap. 4 9 A single tax-exempt financed solid waste disposal facility, for
example, could conceivably use a major portion of the volume cap
of many states. 50
46. I.R.C. § 146 (1986). The term "private activity bonds" as used in the Code refers
to exempt facility bonds as defined in I.R.C. § 142(a) (1986), mortgage bonds, veteran's
mortgage bonds, small issue bonds, student loan bonds, redevelopment bonds and
501(c)(3) bonds (available for non-profit organizations). I.R.C. § 141(d) (1986).
47. I.R.C. § 146(d)(1) (1986).
48. I.R.C. § 146(d)(2) (1986).
49. Notwithstanding the view of Congress and the Treasury Department of what
constitutes a proper "public purpose," many state and local governments believe that
privatization of various governmental functions, such as waste disposal, operation of
correctional facilities, and mass transportation, will permit provision of these services at
lower cost to their taxpayers. Unfortunately, the new rules created by the Tax Reform
Act will limit the ability of state and local governments to finance these activities. Many
of these projects will either be financed on a taxable basis or will be done on a tax-
exempt basis, using a portion of the annual volume cap. State and local governments
will face difficult policy decisions in attempting to choose between providing additional
affordable housing and, for example, building resource recovery facilities to deal with
the growing problem of waste disposal.
50. For example, a solid waste disposal facility under construction in Massachusetts
has already used $150 million of the annual volume cap, which represents approximately
half of the available tax-exempt private activity bond volume cap in the state, and the
facility developers are currently applying for more bond proceeds to finance a project
expansion. When a solid waste disposal facility servicing only a small geographic area
within the state uses $150 million of tax-exempt private activity bonds, and the Massa-
chusetts Housing Finance Agency issues approximately $62 million of mortgage reve-
nue bonds and $108 million of multi-family housing bonds as it did in 1987,
Massachusetts' private activity volume can be easily used without reference to any other
public purposes such as the redevelopment of urban areas or the issuing of student loan
funds (data on file with authors).
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Revisions to the "arbitrage" rules in the Code have further lim-
ited the funds available for housing projects. 5' Prior to the Tax Re-
form Act, it was possible to earn a limited amount of arbitrage profit
on bond proceeds. This arbitrage profit could then be invested in
the facility or program. In the case of a mortgage revenue bond
issue, the arbitrage profit is the difference between the yield on the
bonds and the expected rate of interest on the mortgages purchased
with the bond proceeds. Section 148 of the Code now provides a
complex set of rules that either prohibit the making of arbitrage
profits or require that these profits be rebated to the United
States. 52 In the case of mortgage revenue bonds, the issuer may
also elect to rebate profits to the mortgagors. 53 When structuring a
multi-family housing financing, an HFA may no longer apply invest-
ment earnings to the payment of project costs during the construc-
tion period and therefore must either finance a smaller, less
expensive development or increase the size of the borrowing to
cover the earnings now subject to "rebate."
Other specific provisions of the Code have limited the tax advan-
tages of purchasing tax-exempt housing bonds, making bond-fi-
nanced housing less attractive to the developers and bond investors.
The reduction in the marginal tax rates effected by the Tax Reform
Act has reduced the "benefit" of receiving tax-exempt interest in-
come. This may reduce the demand for tax-exempt debt and
thereby increase the cost of borrowing for all issuers, including
HFAs. In addition, as a result of the Tax Reform Act, the Code
requires that interest on housing bonds be included in the calcula-
51. I.R.C. § 148 (1986). The disparity between taxable and tax-exempt interest
rates creates situations where HFAs and developers can invest the proceeds of lower-
cost tax-exempt bonds in higher-yielding taxable investments in order to generate an
"arbitrage" profit. For example, if an HFA can borrow funds at an 8% tax-exempt rate
and invest the bonds proceeds in taxable obligations yielding 10%, it can profit by the
interest rate differential of 2% per year. Section 148 prohibits this form of "investment
earnings." For pre-Tax Reform Act exceptions, see I.R.C. § 103(c) (1984).
As issuers and developers increasingly explored avenues for exploiting the limited
exceptions to realize arbitrage profits, the Tax Reform Act imposed rebate rules to gov-
ern these "investment earnings." Under the 1986 Code, with few exceptions, amounts
earned from the investments of "gross proceeds" in excess of the yield of the bonds
must be rebated to the United States Treasury at least every five years. I.R.C. § 148(0
(1986). Although the pre-Tax Reform Act arbitrage exceptions-"temporary periods,"
"reasonably required reserve or replacement funds," and "minor portion"-are still re-
tained in the 1986 Code, the impact of the rebate rules is to nullify these arbitrage profit
opportunities.
For a brief discussion of the changes in the arbitrage rules under the Tax Reform Act,
see generally Arey & O'Connor, Tax-Exempt Obligations after the Tax Reform Act of
1986-Brief for the Local Government Attorney, 19 Urb. Law 1051, 1056-61 (1987).
52. I.R.C. § 148(0(2) (1986).
53. I.R.C. § 143(g)(3)(A) (1986).
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tion of the alternative minimum tax imposed on corporations and
individuals. 54 This has resulted in decreased demand by pension
funds, insurance companies, and other traditional institutional pur-
chasers of housing bonds. Broadening the base for alternative mini-
mum tax has produced higher interest rates for tax-exempt housing
bonds and, in turn, increased housing costs for both low- and mod-
erate-income renters and home buyers.
At the programmatic level, the Tax Reform Act has drastically
curtailed the financing of multi-family housing by tax-exempt
bonds, and the one year extension of the expiration date for mort-
gage revenue bonds cannot sustain current single family housing
bond programs.
A. Multi-Family Housing Bonds
The Tax Reform Act has tightened the low-income tenant re-
quirements for multi-family housing projects financed by tax-ex-
empt bonds55 and has rendered investments in real estate less
attractive for developers. 56 The cash flow from multi-family housing
projects has thereby been reduced, providing a disincentive to the
development of low- and moderate-income rental housing.
Under the Act's new set-aside requirements for low-income ten-
ants, an issuer must select one of two set-aside requirements for a
project by the time the bonds are issued. Either a minimum of 20%
of a project's units must be occupied by tenants with annual in-
comes of 50% or less of area median gross income, or at least 40%
of the units must be rented to tenants at or below 60% of area me-
dian gross income. 57 Unlike prior laws, 58 the new Code requires
determination of whether a tenant qualifies as low- to moderate-in-
come under the set-aside requirement on at least an annual basis,
rather than only once at the time of initial occupancy. 59
A tenant is treated as low-income for the purpose of meeting this
requirement unless his or her income rises to a level greater than
54. I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1986). Under the provisions of these sections an individual or a
corporate taxpayer must, in addition to computing its "regular" tax liability, compute its
"alternative minimum taxable income" and its corresponding alternative minimum tax
liability. I.R.C. § 55 (1986). If the alternative minimum tax liability exceeds the regular
tax liability, it is imposed instead. I.R.C. § 55(a) (1986).
55. I.R.C. § 142(d) (1986).
56. I.R.C. § 148 (1986).
57. I.R.C. § 142(d)(1) (1986).
58. I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A) (1984) (repealed by Tax Reform Act, supra note 2, at
§ 1301(b)).
59. I.R.C. § 142(d)(3)(A) (1986).
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140% of the maximum applicable income level that qualified him or
her as low-income. 60 A tenant whose income exceeds 140% of the
maximum applicable income will no longer be treated as occupying
a low-income dwelling that counts toward compliance with the set-
aside requirement. 61 The Conference Committee Report to the Tax
Reform Act indicates that Congress did not intend for tenants who
cease to qualify as low-income to be evicted in order to restore a
project to compliance with the set-aside requirement. 62 Instead,
penalties will not be imposed for non-compliance so long as the
next vacant project unit of comparable or smaller size is rented to a
qualified low-income tenant in order to return the project to
compliance. 63
This new set-aside restriction has rendered many multi-family
rental-housing bond financings uneconomical and has resulted in a
sharp decline in the volume of multi-family residential rental bonds
issued since 1985. 64 Prior to this restriction, the revenue stream
from the market-rate rental units in a mixed development offset the
low-level cash flow from the set-aside dwellings. As the result of the
more stringent set-aside requirement under the Tax Reform Act, it
is more difficult to produce an adequate cash flow from a project as
a whole. When this provision is coupled with the recent cutbacks in
of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) Section 8 rental assistance program,6 5 and other provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act that have reduced the attractiveness of
60. I.R.C. § 142(d)(3)(B) (1986).
61. I.R.C. § 142(d)(3)(B) (1986).
62. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in Tax Re-
form Act of 1986: Law and Controlling Committee Reports (CCH) $ 8301 (1986).
63. I.R.C. § 142(d)(3)(B) (1986).
64. The volume of multi-family rental housing bonds fell 15.8% from $3.37 billion
in 1986 to $2.84 billion in 1987. This decline follows an 84.5% drop in 1986 from the
record volume of $21.8 billion in 1985. In comparison, new issues of single family mort-
gage bonds rose 11% from $7.52 billion in 1986 to $8.35 billion in 1987. This is still
substantially below the $15.7 billion of single family housing mortgage revenue bonds
issued in 1985. The Bond Buyer, Mar. 9, 1988, at 1, 23.
65. The Section 8 Rental Assistance Program is a rental subsidy program established
under the United States Housing Act of 1937, supra note 5, as amended by the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, supra note 5. This program provides subsi-
dies to landlords to cover the difference between the rent charged for a dwelling and the
rent that a low-income resident can afford to pay for housing (which is computed as a
designated percentage of income). The Section 8 subsidy is paid directly to a landlord
on the tenant's behalf, but the tenant chooses where to live and may transfer residences
without losing the benefit of the program. Subsidized units must meet certain quality
standards set by HUD. With concern over budget deficits mounting, Congress, in the
Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1159
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), repealed the authorization for Section 8
new construction and substantial rehabilitation. The federal government, however, re-




real estate investments generally, the production of multi-family
bond-financed housing has sharply declined.
To replace some of the tax benefits that traditionally went to de-
velopers of low-income housing, the Tax Reform Act provides a
new low-income housing tax credit program for multi-family rental
housing. 66 The tax credit, which is only available to developers
building affordable rental housing for needy, low-income families
and individuals, is based upon the number of units made available
to low-income tenants.67 To qualify, a project must meet require-
ments similar to the minimum low-income set-aside requirement for
multi-family rental housing bonds. 68 In addition, the Code limits
the rent that may be charged to low-income tenants in units which
qualify for the tax credit.69
Although the tax credit has been available for only approximately
eighteen months, data indicate that few investors have taken advan-
tage of the credit since its enactment.70 The limitations that the Tax
Reform Act has imposed on the value of tax credits in general di-
lutes the ability of this new tax vehicle to provide an incentive for
substantial numbers of new multi-family housing developments.
Developers are now limited to $25,000 of tax losses and credits for
all business operations, and even these benefits are phased out
ments contracts. Because of the long term of these contracts, federal assistance for units
in the existing Section 8 housing program will continue into the next century.
66. I.R.C. § 42 (1986). As of 1987, the low-income housing tax credit was 9% of the
"qualified basis" of each low-income building. The credit may be applied in conjunction
with tax-exempt bond financing or other federal subsidies, but the credit is reduced to
4% for buildings which are federally subsidized for the applicable taxable year. I.R.C.
§ 42(b)(1) (1986). See generally Steams, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: A Poor
Solution to the Housing Crisis, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 202 (1988); Callison, New Tax
Credit for Low-Income Housing Provides Investment Incentive, 66J. Tax'n 100 (1986);
Carlisle, The Credit for Low Income Housing: Whose Shelter is it?, 3 Real Est. Fin. 44
(1987); Delta, A Critique of the Low-Income Housing Credit, 3 Tax Mgmt. Real Est. J.
114 (1987).
67. I.R.C. § 42(d)(3) (1986).
68. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1) (1986).
69. I.R.C. § 42(g)(2) (1986).
70. Data compiled by the National Counsel of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA)
indicate that states allocated about $65 million (20%) of the $317 million low-income
housing tax credit authority they had available during 1987. The credit program tended
to be the most successful where state subsidies could be coupled with the tax credit. For
example, Massachusetts, which has developed a state-funded rental subsidy program,
allocated the most tax credit in 1987, awarding $6.2 million (55%) out of $11.17 million
available. See Ideas and Trends, 15 Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 787 (Mar. 7, 1988).
NCSHA Executive Vice President Carl W. Reidy, Jr., noted that state agencies generally
considered multi-family projects to be unfeasible with the credit alone. In his view, the
difficulty also stems from the programs' complexity and the lack of federal regulations
governing the administration of the programs. Id. at 788.
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when adjusted gross income reaches a certain level. 71 Thus, only
relatively small developers are able to reap the full benefit of the tax
credit provisions. Members of both houses of Congress introduced
legislation on March 1, 1988, to amend the Code limits on use of the
low-income housing credit in order to make the credits more attrac-
tive to investors.72 Ironically, the Tax Reform Act has created disin-
centives to the production of new multi-family rental housing
despite the critical need to increase the stock of decent and afforda-
ble rental housing for needy families and individuals.
B. Single Family Mortgage Bonds
The Tax Reform Act established the first federal income restric-
tions for recipients of mortgage loans financed by tax-exempt
bonds, although the vast majority of state and local issuers had pre-
viously imposed their own income limits. 73 Under the Act, the an-
nual income of a borrower may not exceed 115% of the median
family gross income for the state or the area in which the residence
is located, whichever is greater.74 A different standard, however,
71. I.R.C. § 469 (1986). Currently a taxpayer may use the tax credit only to offset
tax liability from "passive activities." Under this section a "passive" activity will gener-
ally be any activity involving the conduct of trade or business in which a taxpayer does
not materially participate. Any rental activity, including rental real estate, will be passive
activity without regard to whether the taxpayer materially participates.
72. H.R. 4048, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); S. 2115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
Under the proposed legislation, current limits on the use of the low-income housing tax
credit would be replaced by existing tax law limits on use of business credits. For a brief
review of current limits on the use of the credit, see Stearns, supra note 66, at 209-11.
The proposed legislation also permits non-profit organizations to join private inves-
tors initiating and financing housing projects. The use of the low-income housing tax
credit by a non-profit corporation is, however, problematic. Non-profit corporations
cannot use the credit to offset their own tax liability. Rather, they must transfer the tax
credit to their private partners in exchange for equity financing. Then, even if an appli-
cable financial structure can be determined, the costs of syndication may be prohibitive
for non-profit corporations without sufficient financial backing to afford the highly spe-
cialized legal and financial assistance required in the development and administration of
public-private alliances. See Stearns, supra note 66, at 217-23. For a general discussion
of the role of non-profit corporations in the provision of tax-exempt multi-family rental
developments, see Note, Low Income Housing Under the New Conservatism: Trickle
Down or Dry Up?, 26 Santa Clara L. Rev. 461 (1986).
73. Ninety-eight percent of the HFAs had "[set] income and/or purchase price limits
at the state level before and/or below the federally established limits [in the Tax Reform
Act]." Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, Nat'l Council of State
Housing Agencies, & Ass'n of Local Housing Finance Agencies, A Referendum on the
American Dream: A Rebuttal of the General Accounting Office of the United States'
Report on Qualified Mortgage Revenue Bonds 29 (1988) [hereinafter Referendum on
the American Dream] (emphasis deleted).
74. I.R.C. § 143(f)(1), (4) (1986). The Code further provides that "the family in-
come of mortgagors, and area median gross income, shall be determined.. . taking into
account the regulations prescribed under Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of




applies to home buyers purchasing residences in targeted areas. At
least two-thirds of the mortgage financing provided in targeted ar-
eas must go to borrowers with incomes not exceeding 140% of the
higher of the state or area median family gross income; the remain-
der of the bond proceeds set-aside for the targeted area may be
loaned without income restriction. 75 By enabling HFAs to adjust
the median area gross income figure for family size, the Code does
not discriminate against large low- and moderate-income families.76
Although the Tax Reform Act subjects single family programs to
the burden of income restrictions upon potential home buyers, the
Act has affected these programs less than it has multi-family rental
housing. To a large extent, Congress did not focus attention upon
mortgage revenue bond programs because of their pending sunset
in 1987. In fact, the Tax Reform Act extended the sunset for mort-
gage revenue bonds from December 31, 1987, to December 31,
1988. 77 At present, there is substantial support in both houses for
bills to extend the sunset until December 31, 1991.78 The General
Accounting Office (GAO) released a study on March 21, 1988,79
claiming that most tax-exempt mortgage loans are given to borrow-
ers who do not need financial aid to purchase a house and arguing
that, therefore, the scheduled expiration of this program should not
be amended.
IlL Criticisms of Tax-Exempt Housing Bond Financing.
In spite of the Tax Reform Act initiatives aimed at restricting the
application of multi-family rental bonds and mortgage revenue
bonds to low- and moderate-income families and individuals, there
is still considerable criticism of the efficiency and effectiveness of
these programs. The efficiency criticism is concerned with whether
an appropriate proportion of the federal revenue applied to tax-ex-
empt financing benefits housing, while the effectiveness criticism fo-
cuses on whether these financings assist those most unable to obtain
75. I.R.C. § 143(f)(3) (1986).
76. See Rev. Rul. 86-124, 1986-2 C.B. 27. This ruling contains guidelines prescrib-
ing the manner in which the income limits are to be applied. The income limits may be
adjusted for smaller and larger families if these adjustments are made with respect to all
owner-financing provided under a tax-exempt bond issue. Id. at 28.
77. I.R.C. § 143(a)(l)(B) (1986). It should be noted that the Tax Reform Act also
changed the name of "mortgage subsidy bonds" to "mortgage revenue bonds."
78. H.R. 2640, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1522, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987). As of April 22, 1988, H.R. 2640 had a total of 325 cosponsors out of 435 Repre-
sentatives, and S. 1522 had 67 cosponsors in the Senate.
79. GAO Report, supra note 11.
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decent and affordable housing. Whereas the effectiveness argu-
ments are program specific, the efficiency argument is part of the
general critique of indirectly subsidizing quasi-public projects
through tax-exempt financing.
A. The Efficacy of Multi-Family Housing Bonds
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act, the 20% set-aside
requirement for rental units constructed with tax-exempt bond pro-
ceeds had come under considerable attack for being too shallow a
target to have a significant impact upon the provision of decent and
affordable rental housing for low-income families and individuals.8 0
In a 1986 report issued prior to the Tax Reform Act, the GAO con-
tended that multi-family housing bonds often only helped moder-
ate-income people obtain better quality rental housing 8' because
households with incomes substantially higher than the average
renter could qualify as low- or moderate-income households. 82 The
GAO further questioned whether the fiscal benefits associated with
tax-exempt financing were passed on to low- and moderate-income
renters, "pocketed" by the developer, or "soaked up" by the trans-
action costs of the tax-exempt financing.8 3 It could be hypothesized
that the decline in new multi-family rental developments since the
advent of the stricter set-aside requirement under the Tax Reform
Act is evidence that the three percentage point reduction in interest
rates developers receive from a tax-exempt financing only enhances
developers' profits.8 4 But, arguably, this is also evidence that the
stringent set-aside requirements and other provisions of the Tax
Reform Act, together with the decline in funds available under other
federal rent-subsidy programs, have rendered multi-family develop-
ments uneconomical.8 5 It is still too soon after the enactment of the
Tax Reform Act for available data to support a definitive answer.
At a general level, the question of whether multi-family housing
bonds are sufficiently targeted to allow low-income families to rent
decent and affordable housing is more complex than many critics of
80. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Joint Comm. on
Tax'n, Rental Housing: Cost and Benefits of Financing With Tax-Exempt Bonds (1986)
[hereinafter Rental Housing Report].
81. Id. at 17-19.
82. Id. at 19-23.
83. Id. at 38-43. The Rental Housing Report contended that without data on the
profitability of alternative developer opportunities, it was not possible to definitively an-
swer this question. Id. at 39-40.
84. Id. at 39.




these programs concede. First, not all low-income housing pro-
grams are designed to, or will, in fact, assist the very needy. The
low- and moderate-income group is heterogeneous and consists of
various sub-sectors such as the poor, the elderly, first-time home
buyers, and those of moderate income seeking an income supple-
ment for upward mobility. It may be unrealistic to expect an indi-
rect subsidy such as tax-exempt financing to be an effective tool for
deep-targeting very-low-income housing problems. Tax-exempt
bonds are sold to investors who expect to be repaid. The interest
costs of bonds are directly related to investors' evaluation of the
credit risk associated with a particular bond issue. As very-low-in-
come households are not good credit risks without rent supple-
ments like the Section 8 program, investors would lack confidence
in the anticipated cash flow from a 100% very-low-income develop-
ment. Thus the bonds might not be marketable at a viable interest
rate. Viewed from this marketplace perspective, the pre-Tax Re-
form Act residential rental housing programs may not have been as
inefficacious as GAO contends. They have assisted many low- and
moderate-income families and individuals in obtaining better qual-
ity rental housing in mixed-income developments. The housing sit-
uation of very-low-income groups may be best addressed by direct
subsidy programs.
B. The Efficacy of Single Family Mortgage Bonds
The 1988 GAO Report typifies the criticism of the effectiveness of
single family mortgage bond issues. This report, based on the ex-
amination of 178,000 loan files from 32 state and local housing
agencies around the country, concludes that revenue bonds issued
to finance loans for single family housing accomplished little public
good for the tax revenue forgone.8" The GAO Report claims that
two-thirds of the loans it examined were received by people who
could have afforded to buy the same house on the same day with a
conventional fixed-rate mortgage or an adjustable-rate mortgage.8 7
Of the remaining one-third of borrowers who could not have
purchased a house when they did without the subsidized mortgage,
many were younger than first-time home buyers in general.8 In ad-
dition, the GAO Report contends that many of this remaining group
86. GAO Report, supra note 11, at 3-4.
87. Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 19, 25.
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of borrowers could still have qualified for conventional financing for
a house costing approximately 10% less than the one they bought.8 9
The methodology of the GAO Report has come under severe crit-
icism. First, housing finance officials have charged that the GAO
used lax underwriting standards in determining whether the people
who received tax-exempt mortgages could have received loans from
conventional lenders. 90 In particular, it failed to take into account
the additional underwriting burdens placed upon first-time home
buyers. Second, the GAO Report compared mortgage bond subsi-
dized loans with all other types of loans, including loans that are
obtained with other types of subsidies such as Federal Housing Ad-
ministration insurance or Veteran's Administration assistance.9' To
support its conclusions, the GAO Report should have compared
mortgage bond loans with conventional financing alone. Finally,
the loans that the GAO Report examined were made before the en-
actment of the Tax Reform Act, 92 which subjects loans from quali-
fied mortgage bond proceeds to new purchase price and income
limitations. Thus, even if the first two criticisms of the GAO Report
are unfounded, post-Tax Reform Act tax-exempt mortgages are
more likely to be targeted to low-income home buyers because of
the new income restrictions.9 3
Serious questions remain as to whether mortgage subsidy bonds
are intended to, or ought to, deep-target the very-low-income home
buyer. As is the case with multi-family residential rental housing,
mortgage subsidy bonds must be marketable at an interest rate low
enough to produce tax-exempt mortgage rates significantly lower
than rates obtainable in the conventional mortgage market. A via-
ble price for the bonds cannot be achieved if subsidized mortgages
are only to be produced for very-low-income (and therefore poor
credit risk) households. However, to the extent that these programs
generate greater movement within the housing market and enable
relatively higher-income groups to own homes, they may make avail-
able more housing for very-low-income persons most in need of
assistance.
Tax-exempt financing coupled with direct federal subsidies would
greatly enhance the efficacy of both multi-family residential rental
and mortgage subsidy bond programs. To withhold direct subsidies
89. Id. at 33.
90. Referendum on the American Dream, supra note 73, at 13-18.
91. Id. at 5-6.
92. Id. at 21-24.




and then to argue that these tax-exempt housing programs are inef-
fective will not produce more and better affordable housing for low-
and moderate-income persons.
C. The Efficiency of Tax-Exempt Housing Bonds
The GAO Report estimated that for every dollar of federal reve-
nue that is applied to tax-exempt mortgage bonds, the average ben-
efit to the subsidized mortgage recipient is less than 30 cents.94 The
other 70 cents is accounted for by factors including underwriter
fees, bond counsel fees, and other administrative costs incurred by
HFAs. Although the efficiency of the federal dollar in tax-exempt
financings is hotly disputed,95 the issuance of tax-exempt bonds is
clearly not a process free of significant transaction costs. Two
problems appear when the GAO Report's use of the statistics on the
efficiency of this indirect subsidy is analyzed. First, the statistics do
not specify what efficiency level would be acceptable. This omission
is significant because any alternative housing program involving
either direct or indirect subsidies would probably involve significant
transaction costs. Second, efficiency is not the only criterion by
which we should judge tax-exempt housing programs.96 The una-
voidable inefficiencies of these housing programs must be balanced
with the social values and concerns they serve-including the imme-
diate need to increase the stock of decent and affordable subsidized
housing in America. It is difficult to argue on efficiency grounds
that tax-exempt housing programs should be abolished when they
are the only federal programs currently addressing America's af-
fordable housing crisis.
IV Toward a Comprehensive Review of Housing Policy in the 1980s
At a time when housing production programs for those with low
incomes are failing to keep pace with the growth in the number of
low-income households, 97 the Tax Reform Act has further eroded
the resources available for the production of new tax-exempt low-
and moderate-income housing. The Tax Reform Act, when com-
94. GAO Report, supra note 11, at 62.
95. Referendum on the American Dream, supra note 73, at 21-74.
96. For a general critique of economic efficiency arguments which fail to address
other social values, see Baker, Starting Points in the Economic Analysis of Law, 8 Hof-
stra L. Rev. 939 (1980); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideol-
ogy in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1979); Michelman, Norms and
Normativity In The Economic Theory of Law, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1015 (1978).
97. Clay, Risk of Loss: The Endangered Future of Low-Income Housing Resources
4 (1987); Apgar & Brown, supra note 1; Stearns, supra note 66, at 204-5.
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bined with the lifting of HUD "user restrictions, ' '9 8 could ultimately
result in the "gentrification" of a substantial portion of the current
federally subsidized low-income rental housing stock. Moreover,
unless the sunset of mortgage revenue bonds is extended, the ability
of low- and moderate-income persons to buy their own homes with
affordable financing will be greatly diminished. This in turn will
raise the price of rental housing and further exacerbate the afforda-
ble housing crisis.
The construction and maintenance of quality low-income rental
housing stock and affordable opportunities for homeownership are
vital. An increased number of rental units is necessary to satisfy the
growing demand for such housing. The ability to obtain reasonably
priced financing, such as that made available through the issuance of
tax-exempt bonds, will enable many renters to become first-time
home buyers. The rental housing previously occupied by these per-
sons can be recycled over time to others most in need of housing
assistance.9 9 Because of the need to meet certain mortgage under-
writing criteria, the subsidized mortgages purchased under single
family programs tend primarily to assist those in the upper portion
of the low- and moderate-income brackets. Yet these programs are
still important for all income levels to the extent that they enable
98. The expiration of "user restrictions" on many HUD subsidized housing projects
built in the late 1960s could result in the depletion of a substantial portion of the ex-
isting privately owned rental housing stock for those with low- and moderate-incomes.
HUD regulatory agreements offer developers a prepayment option that enables them to
escape the burden of "user restrictions" after 20 years of a 40-year mortgage. Accord-
ingly, a large portion of current HUD subsidized rental housing could be "gentrified" by
the end of this century. Congressional Budget Office, Staff Working Paper, The Poten-
tial Loss of Assisted Housing Units as Certain Mortgage-Interest Subsidy Programs Ma-
ture (Mar. 1987).
99. Various avenues for maintaining the affordability of single-family residences
originally financed by tax-exempt bonds are being explored. One attempt to recycle
subsidized single family housing is the Homeownership Opportunity Program instituted
in Massachusetts. Under this program, a local community, for example, may donate a
site to a developer who will then construct single family units and agree to sell a percent-
age of such units to certain qualifying low- and moderate-income persons and families at
specified prices below the fair market value of such units. The individual home buyers
will obtain mortgage financing from the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, which
will further reduce their cost. In addition, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
agreed to provide certain moneys to buy-down the effective interest rate on the individ-
ual mortgage loans. The purchaser of the property must agree that the property will be
resold only to an eligible low- or moderate-income buyer at a price similarly discounted
off the then-fair market value of the property. Thus, the subsidized single family hous-
ing will be recycled among low- and moderate-income families. The effectiveness of this
program will depend, in part, on the continued availability of below market rate mort-
gage loans, such as those now provided by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency.
The Housing Environment in Massachusetts, Report of the Massachusetts Housing Fi-




people to move from the rental to the buyer market. The Harvard
Study concluded that the proportion of low-income households in
the population is growing.' 00 When potential first-time home buy-
ers cannot afford to buy a home, the demand for and cost of rental
housing will increase sharply. In these circumstances, the very-low-
income households will suffer the most, as they can least afford to
pay the higher rents and will be forced to accept the most undesir-
able accomodations. The government must encourage moderate-
income households to move from rental housing into their own
homes and must also provide incentives and resources for the devel-
opment of new multi-family rental properties.
The indirect subsidy provided by housing bonds may not be the
most effective mechanism for addressing many aspects of the low-
income housing problem. Perhaps tax-exempt housing programs
should be considerably revised or even abolished. This conclusion,
however, should be reached only after a thorough examination of
the available economic and social data and a comprehensive review
of the efficacy and efficiency of alternative programs. To date Con-
gress has avoided this review.
The Tax Reform Act exemplifies the dramatic impact revenue
policies may have on substantive policy. When, as the Harvard
Study shows, homeownership rates have declined steadily since
1980 and "[r]ising rents have led to an increasing share of house-
holds paying 30, 40, or even 50 percent of their incomes for rents, if
they can secure housing at all,"'' the need to enhance and fund the
nation's low-income housing stock warrants a more focused exami-
nation than that which occurred during the late summer and early
fall of 1986. Typical of the partial analysis of housing policy under-
taken by those concerned with fiscal policy is that the GAO Report
was released approximately eighteen months after the enactment of
the Tax Reform Act. Unfortunately for those concerned with the
pending low-income housing crisis in the States, the lobbying efforts
of interest groups far more powerful and better financed than those
that support subsidized housing dominated and influenced the com-
mittee and legislative processes during the "hurly-burly" of the
1986 review of the Code.
As the Harvard Study recently concluded, "[t]here is no single
housing problem in America, but a series of problems that confront
100. Apgar & Brown, supra note 1, at 1.
101. Id.
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a wide range of household types."' 0 2 Policy makers must therefore
design programs that can systematically and rationally address the
many facets of the current housing crisis. If raising revenue is Con-
gress's ultimate concern, that goal might be far more easily attained
in the housing area by abolishing the income tax deduction on con-
ventional mortgages for primary and secondary or "vacation"
homes that provides a significant tax break to those in the higher
income brackets,103 than by tinkering with tax-exempt financing
programs for low- and moderate-income families and individuals.
Regardless of one's ultimate goal, however, the housing crisis in
America should be a national priority that demands a legislative re-
sponse informed by a comprehensive analysis of all the issues, not
just the piece-meal concerns of certain fiscal policy makers and in-
terest groups.
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102. Id. at 19.
103. See generally Sheppard, Our Lopsided Federal Housing Tax Policy Analyzed by
National League of Cities and Price Waterhouse, 27 Tax Notes 233 (1985).
Vol. 6:287, 1988
